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NEW FIFTH AMENDMENT INTERROGATION DEFINITION ALLOWS
SUBTLE COMPULSION
RHODE ISLAND . INNIS, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)
In Rhode Island v. Innis' the Supreme Court fashioned a problematic
definition of "interrogation" 2-- incompatible with Miranda3 fifth
amendment 4 safeguards-that offers little guidance to lower courtss
and police6 and amplifies the existing tension between fifth and sixth
amendment' right to counsel cases.8
1. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
2. Id. at 300-01. The Court held:
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody
is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the
term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response from the suspect.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "[T]he prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant un-
less it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination." Id. at 444.
Although incompatible with the Miranda opinion, the Innis holding is not inconsistent with the
Court's gradual erosion of the principles underlying Miranda. See Chase, The Burger Court, the
Individual and the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 518, 555
(1977); Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court and the Legacy ofthe Warren Court, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1319, 1322-23 (1977); Scholl, Sef-Incrimination, 16 AM. CuM. L. REV. 37, 42 (1978);
Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational Rights: Relections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1978).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides, in part: "[N]or shall any person
... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ......
5. 446 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens notes that the majority's holding
marks a "plain departure from the principles set forth in Miranda," particularly in its effect on the
"scrupulously honored" standard announced in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 107 (1975)
(White, J., concurring). The Mosley standard governed police conduct after an accused's decision
to exercise his right to cut-off questioning.
6. 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice expressed doubt that police
officers are competent to "evaluate the suggestibility and susceptibility" of in-custody suspects to
words or actions by the police that might prompt incriminating responses. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states in part: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
8. 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Seegenerally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams,
Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation?: When Does it Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1 (1978);
Comment, The Right to Counsel in Police Interrogation Cases: Miranda and Williams, 12 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 112 (1978); Comment, Brewer v. Williams: The End of Post-Charging Interrogation, 10
Sw. U.L. REV. 331 (1978). See also Keefe, Confessions, Admissions and the Recent Curtailment of
the Ffih 4mendment Protection, 51 CONN. B.J. 266 (1977).
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Police officers arrested Thomas J. Innis after receiving a complaint
that implicated him in separate robbery and murder incidents. 9 The
unarmed suspect, upon hearing his Miranda rights,10 acknowledged
comprehension and asked to confer with a lawyer." Three officers
transported the suspect in a squad car to a police station.' 2 En route,
one of the patrolmen conversed with another officer and voiced con-
cern regarding the whereabouts of a shotgun used in the alleged
crimes.1 3  The shotgun presumably was secreted near a school for
9. Shortly after midnight on Jan. 12, 1975, a taxicab driver identified Innis as the shotgun-
wielding assailant who robbed him earlier in the evening. Five days earlier another Providence,
Rhode Island, cab driver had been murdered by a shotgun blast to the head. The police com-
menced a search of the area for Innis after the identification. 446 U.S. at 293.
10. At 4:30 a.m. Innis was located and arrested. Approximately twelve officers responded to
the scene of the arrest. Three of the officers were in direct contact with the suspect and all three
advised Innis of his constitutional rights. Brief for Respondent at 5, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980).
11. 446 U.S. at 294.
12. The ranking officer at the scene of the arrest directed three officers to transport the sus-
pect to a police station without questioning, intimidating, or coercing him in any manner. Testi-
mony about the seating arrangements in the car conflicted, although it is clear that all occupants
heard the conversation. Id. at 294 n.1; State v. Innis, - R.I. .. , _ 391 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1978).
The majority paid scant attention to the seating arrangements. Professor Grano, however, has
argued that the positioning of the officers was relevant to show the intent of the police "to provoke
a response and the degree of pressure experienced by Innis." See Grano, Rhode Island Y. Innir 4
Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CIUM.
L. REV. 1, 2 n.8 (1979).
13. 446 U.S. at 294 n.1; State v. Innis, - R.I. _..,391 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1978). Testimony
at trial characterized the conversation in the police car as follows:
A. [Officer Gleckman] At this point, I was talking back and forth with Patrolman Mc-
Kenna stating that I frequent this area while on patrol and there's a lot of handi-
capped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might
find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.
Q. Who were you talking to?
A. Patrolman McKenna.
Q. Did you say anything to the suspect Innis?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Had anybody said anything to him?
A. No.
Q. And you were talking to Patrolman McKenna?
A. Right.
Q. And what happened next?
A. At that point, as I was saying, there is kids running around there, as it is a handi-
capped school, and he says, you know, back and forth with Patrolman McKenna, he
[Innis] at this point said: "Stop, turn around, I'll show you where it is." At this
point, Patrolman McKenna got on the mike and told the captain: "We're returning
to the scene of the crime, or where the weapon might be, and the subject is going to
show us where it will be."
Record at 41, 43-44, Rhode Island v. Innis, - R.I. _ 391 A.2d 1158 (1978). Officer McKenna
corroborated officer Gleckman's account:
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handicapped children and posed a threat to the children's safety. Innis,
immediately following the officer's remarks, agreed to lead police to the
weapon.' 4 The trial court admitted into evidence the shotgun and the
suspect's statements to the police.' 5 The court convicted Innis of kid-
napping, robbery, and murder.' 6 The Rhode Island Supreme Court set
aside the conviction, finding an "interrogation" of the defendant with-
out a valid waiver of his fifth amendment right to counsel.' 7 The
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and held: Under the Miranda
doctrine the term "interrogation" refers only to a police officer's words
or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect.'
The defendant's privilege against self-incrimination developed dur-
ing the eighteenth century, 19 and finally resulted in adoption of the fifth
amendment self-incrimination clause.20  As accusatorial systems of
criminal justice ascended over prior inquisatorial models, courts re-
A. [Officer McKenna] I more or less concurred with him [Gleckman] that it was a
safety factor and that we should, you know, continue to search for the weapon and
try to find it.
Id. at 53. The third officer in the car heard the conversation but did not speak:
A. He [Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the little-I believe he said girl-would
pick up the gun, maybe kill herself.
Id. at 59.
14. 446 U.S. at 295. Innis' response clearly was the product of Officer Gleckman's state-
ments. Before leading the police to where he had hidden the shotgun Innis was again apprised of
his rights. He stated that he understood his rights and "wanted to get the gun out of the way
because of the kids in the area of the school." Id.
15. Id. at 296. The trial court ruled that Innis had made an intelligent waiver of his Miranda
rights without considering whether he had been subjected to interrogation.
16. Id.
17. Id. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island is reported at - R.I. _, 391
A.2d 1158 (1978). Innis' assignment of error on appeal was the failure of the trial court to sup-
press evidence-the shotgun, some shells, and his statements related to their discovery--obtained
in violation of the fifth amendment. 391 A.2d at 1160.
18. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
19. Two common-law maxims---nemo teneturprodere seipsum (no one is bound to betray
himself) and nemo esse testes in propria causa (no man should be a witness in his own case)-
illustrate the philosophy behind the privilege against self-incrimination. See P. DEVLIN, THE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 18 (1958); L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIF'rH AMENDMENT
423 (1968). See also Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents.- Some Comments on the
"New"Fifth Amendment andthe old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59, 66 (1966); Spring,
The Nebulous Nexus: Ercobedo, Miranda, and the New Fifth Amendment, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 428,
434-35 (1967).
20. The inequities of ecclesiastical inquisitions and oppressiveness of the notorious Star
Chamber proceedings in seventeenth century England prompted the framers to adopt the privi-
lege against compulsory incrimination in the fifth amendment. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 596-97 (1896); Spring, 4vupra note 19, at 434-35.
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garded confessions as unreliable evidence of guilt." Courts admitted
confessions into evidence only if the statement22 was deemed "volun-
tary." Courts thereafter considered a combination of factors under a
"totality of circumstances" test, to determine whether an admission was
voluntary.24 The lack of a requirement that the police forewarn sus-
21. The King v. Warrickshall, 1 Leach C.C. 262, 168 E.R. 234 (K.B. 1783). Confessions
elicited under pressure were subject to "a fair risk of falsity." See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 822-826 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970); Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police
Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 452-54 (1964).
22. A statement did not have to be a complete confession to warrant exclusion from trial as
an involuntary admission. See Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621 (1896). But see Stein v.
New York, 346 U.S. 156, 190 (1953).
23. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 549-61 (1897); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S.
355, 357 (1896); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884). The early voluntariness approach, first
adopted in 1884 by the Supreme Court, incorporated notions of reliability:
[Tihe presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence, namely, that one who is
innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement,
ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of induce-
ments of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred,
or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such person, which, operating
upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him of that
freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the
meaning of the law.
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) (emphasis added).
In Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), a self-incrimination theory was used to exclude a
compelled confession from evidence. This approach, however, lay dormant until Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), discussed infra at notes 36 and 37. The dominant test of confession admis-
sibility from 1884 through 1940 remained "whether the confession was obtained in reliability-
impairing circumstances." See Herman, supra note 21, at 453 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 286 (1936) and Ziang Sun Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924)).
24. Physical abuse and threats of harm rendered confessions involuntary and consequently
inadmissible into evidence. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (denial of food);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (suspect stripped and denied clothes for extended
period of time); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (threats of mob violence); White v. Texas, 310
U.S. 530 (1940) (accused repeatedly interrogated in woods at night); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936) (suspect stripped, whipped, and beaten before signing confession).
The Court also recognized the propensity of psychological ploys to overbear the will of an
accused. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (offer of leniency's effect on will to
resist); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (police threat to arrest spouse precipitated con-
fession); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (police officer played upon former relationship
with accused to elicit confession); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (trained psychiatrist inter-
rogated suspect, induced confession); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (extended solitary con-
finement).
The Court eventually expanded the concept into a "totality of circumstances" test and applied a
multitude of factors cumulatively. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (lack of
warnings, incommunicado detention, conditioned promise to allow phone call to spouse); Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (lack of education, low mentality, susceptibility to psychological
pressure, incommunicado detention, violation of state prompt arraignment statute); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (suspect's age [151, time of night interrogation occurred, duration of
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pects of their privilege not to speak, however, partially emasculated the
early "voluntariness" approach.' 5
Increasingly, courts began to evaluate police methods for eliciting
confessions.26 Even if a confession is "voluntary," the statement be-
comes inadmissible into evidence if obtained by illegal police meth-
ods.27
interrogation, absence and denial of counsel, callous attitude of police). But cf. Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (unfair procedures must actually coerce a confession to render it invol-
untary).
The Court utilized the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to apply federal confes-
sion standards to the states to curb abuses in state courts. The fourteenth amendment provides:
"IN]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). See generally Gangi,.4 Critical View of the Modern
Confession Rule: Some Observations on Key Confession Cases, 28 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1974). See also
People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927).
25. See Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912). See also Developments in the Law-
Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REV. 935, 978 (1966).
26. See Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 71 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S.
62, 63 (1949); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 149 (1944).
27. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959);
Kamisar, What is an Involuntarv Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Inter-
rogation and Confession, 17 RUTGERs L. REv. 728, 754-55 (1963). The Spano Court reasoned:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on
their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police
must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much
endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
the actual criminals themselves.
360 U.S. at 320-21 (emphasis added).
An adjunct to the police methods and voluntariness-reliability approaches was the McNabb-
Mallory rule. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943). The rule declared admissions following a period of unnecessary delay in arraign-
ment inadmissible into evidence. The cases held that violations of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure barred admissions made during the unnecessary delay. Rule 5(a) states:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary
delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the event that a federal magis-
trate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18
U.S.C. § 3041.
18 U.S.C. § 5(a) (1976). The lower federal courts effectively nullified McNabb by requiring a
causal connection between the confession and detention. State courts ignored it. See generally
Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
785, 803-10 (1970); Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47
GEo. LJ. 1 (1958). Congress purported to overrule the McNabb-Mallory rule in favor of a "vol-
untariness" standard by enacting the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1976).
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In Crooker v. California28 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held
that the due process clause did not require all interrogation of a suspect
to cease after a request for counsel.29 The following year, however, the
dissenting justices in Crooker forcefully reasserted their views in a con-
curring opinion in Spano v. New York. 3" The Spano concurrence rec-
ognized that after imposition of a formal charge or indictment an
accused's right to assistance of counsel attached.3 This aspect of
Spano is limited, however, because the Court relied on the coercion of
the suspect and carefully circumvented the right to counsel issue.32
Nevertheless, courts followed the minority view.33
In the early 1960's the due process-voluntariness test still controlled
the admissibility of a statement, despite pointed criticism of its effec-
tiveness as a safeguard of suspects' rights.34 The Court regarded deni-
als of requests for counsel by subjects of police interrogation as part of
the "totality of circumstances" governing the voluntariness of a state-
ment.
35
28. 357 U.S. 433 (1958), rev'd, 384 U.S. 436, 479 n.48 (1966).
29. 357 U.S. 438-41. See also Cicencia v. Lagey, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), rev'd, 384 U.S. 436, 479
n.48 (1966).
30. 360 U.S. 315, 324-27 (1959) (Douglas & Stewart, J.J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. The Court did not reach the question of whether any confession obtained in the absence
of counsel could be used without violating the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 320.
33. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964) (collecting cases).
34. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 455 (1961) (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark in dissent
described the voluntariness approach as an "elusive, measureless standard of psychological coer-
cion heretofore developed in this Court by accretion on almost an ad hoc, case-by-case basis
.Id See generally Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786-88, 803-10 (1970) (removal, workload, lack of legislative atten-
tion, limited effect of decisions, inherent inability of the judicial system to control abusive prac-
tices at lowest levels undermine case-by-case approach); Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1956) (same); White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions,
127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 586 (1979) (traditional litigation process not suited to gauge pressure on
suspects). See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960).
Professor Kamisar expresses concern that the "remoteness" of the Supreme Court as the review-
ing body in a case-by-case approach inadequately protects suspects' rights. As support for this
criticism he observed that in a thirty year period following Brown v. Mississippi the Court granted
certiorari to only one-third of the petitioners seeking review of confessions. Of these, two-thirds
were capital murder cases. Kamisar, supra note 19, at 102-03.
35. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 602 n.54 (1961). The "totality of circumstances-voluntariness" test retains vitality in the fed-
eral courts as a result of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1976). See United States v. Bear Killer, 534 F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 846 (1976); United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1973). See also United States v.
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In Malloy v. Hogan36 the Court revived the fifth amendment as the
constitutional embodiment of the right against self-incrimination in po-
lice interrogations.37 Thereafter, in Miranda v. Arizona38 the Court es-
tablished universally applicable guidelines for custodial interrogation
to protect fifth amendment privileges.39 The Miranda Court embraced
the principle that the fifth amendment proscribes compulsion in any
custodial setting,4" but does not prohibit the taking of statements from
Smith, 608 F.2d 1011, 1012 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hines, 605 F.2d 132, 134 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); United States ex rel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 441 F.2d 1073,
1075 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971).
Some states have followed Congress' approach as well. See, e.g., People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d
173, 179, 326 N.E.2d 383, 386 (1975); Montes v. State, 263 Ind. 390, 399, 332 N.E.2d 786, 792
(1975); State v. Franks, 239 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa 1976); State v. Colin, 214 Kan. 193, 195, 519
P.2d 629, 631 (1974); State v. Riedel, 211 Kan. 872, 876, 508 P.2d 878, 882 (1973). See generally
note 24 supra and accompanying text.
36. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
37. Incorporation of the fifth amendment through the fourteenth amendment allowed the
Court to make the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination the applicable
constitutional standard in state criminal prosecutions. Id. at 8. See Herman, supra note 21, at
463.
38. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. Id. at 444. The Court provided:
As for procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are de-
vised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous op-
portunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Id.
40. The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." id. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970) (collecting cases defining custo-
dial interrogation under Miranda).
The Miranda opinion did not limit custodial interrogation to those conducted in the sta-
tionhouse. 384 U.S. at 461. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions evidence the Court's restrictive
view of the ambiguous "custodial setting" concept as a guide to the scope of Miranda. See United
States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977) (Miranda not applicable to grand jury hearings); United
States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977) (same); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977) (no
custodial interrogation when suspect voluntarily submitted to police request for a meeting at the
stationhouse); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (grand jury hearings); Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (Miranda not applicable to noncriminal proceedings). But see
United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 1977) (inherent coerciveness of backseat of
police car). See generally Note, Custodial Interrogation After Oregon v. Mathiason, 1978 DuKE
L.J. 1497, 1502; Comment, Custodial Interrogation, 35 TENN. L. REv. 604 (1968); 57 OR. L. REv.
184 (1977). See also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976); Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324, 326 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968).
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a suspect.4 The majority demonstrated cognizance of both the valua-
ble role confessions play in law enforcement and the need to safeguard
the privilege against self-incrimination from the inherent compulsion
of custodial interrogation.42 The Court required the police to adminis-
ter informative warnings4 3 and cease "custodial interrogation" if sus-
pects invoked' their privilege. Miranda, furthermore, reinforced the
41. 384 U.S. at 478. The Court explained:
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of
course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege [against self-
incrimination] while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the
police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated.
Id.
42. An individual subjected to custodial interrogation "cannot be otherwise than under a
compulsion to speak." Id. at 461. Justice White was critical of this conclusive presumption in his
Miranda dissent:
Although in the Court's view in-custody interrogation is inherently coercive, the Court
says that the spontaneous product of the coercion of arrest and detention is still to be
deemed voluntary. [A suspect] may blurt out a confession which will be admissible de-
spite the fact that he is alone and in custody, without any showing that he had any notion
of his right to remain silent or of the consequences of his admission.
Id. at 533 (White, J., with Harlan & Stewart, J.J., dissenting). See A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 120 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1974); A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-
RAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 39-40 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968); H. FRIENDLY, A Postscriot on Miranda,
BENCHMARKS 226, 271 (1967); Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation andthe Right to
Counsel Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 62, 70-73 (1966).
Bator and Vorenberg suggest:
More basic is the point that the policy of privilege against self-incrimination is to prevent
compulsion, and not self-incrimination in the absence of compulsion. Its policy [fifth
amendment] is to give people a choice whether to make incriminating statements or not,
and this policy is effectuated by safeguarding conditions for the exercise of responsible
choice, and does not require a system which, by barring all questioning, insures that the
exercise of this choice will always go in one direction-that of silence.
Id. at 70. See also Kamisar, supra note 8, at 50.
43. 384 U.S. at 471, 473:
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly in-
formed that he has a right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer with him during
interrogation.... As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything
stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to
interrogation.
In order to fully apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this
system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an
attorney, but also if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
Id.
44. The Court prohibited interrogation after suspects indicate in any manner at any stage
during custody their desire to remain silent or confer with an attorney, even if the subjects had
previously volunteered statements. 384 U.S. at 473-74. The Court explicitly outlined the proce-
dure:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. . . . If the indi-
vidual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
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Court's disapproval of patent psychological ploys-verbal or nonver-
bal-designed to elicit incriminating responses."
The Court, in Michigan v. Tucker,46 narrowly construed the Miranda
doctrine.47 In Tucker the Court upheld the admission into evidence of
a statement not preceded by full warnings. The Court distinguished
between actual violation of the fifth amendment and violation of the
prophylactic rules developed to protect fifth amendment rights.48
When violations of the prophylactic guidelines occur, Miranda49 no
longer automatically precludes the admissibility of arguably involun-
tary statements.5 0
In Michigan v. Mosley5 the Court again demonstrated its reluctance
to construe Miranda strictly by allowing the resumption of interroga-
present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attor-
ney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual can-
not obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to the police,
they must respect his decision to remain silent.
Id. at 474.
45. See Driver, Confessions andthe Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 42, 50-
51 (1968); Comment, Deceptive Interrogation Techniques & the Relinquishment of Constitutional
Rights, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 109, 147 (1977). See also C. McCoRMiCK, EVIDENCE 330 (E. Cleary 2d
ed. 1972); J. WIrMORE, EVIDENCE § 826a, at 383 n.23 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
The Miranda majority discussed at length psychological ploys taught to police officers for the
express purpose of maximizing the effectiveness of police confession elicitation. 384 U.S. at 436.
See F. IN BAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 60-61 (2d ed. 1967); C.
O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 102-03 (lst ed. 1956).
46. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). One court intimated that Tucker overruled Miranda and reinstated
the traditional voluntariness test. United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1137 (10th Cir. 1975).
47. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 100-01.
Professor Stone noted:
[Tlhe Court, in the years since Warren Burger assumed the role of Chief Justice, has
handed down eleven decisions concerning the scope and application of Miranda. In ten
of these cases, the Court interpreted Miranda so as not to exclude the challenged evi-
dence. In the remaining case [Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)], the Court avoided a
direct ruling on the Miranda issue holding the evidence inadmissible on other grounds.
Id. at 100.
48. 417 U.S. at 450.
49. 384 U.S. at 474. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
50. 417 U.S. at 451. Courts must apply a balancing test, weighing the interest of allowing the
jury to consider reliable evidence of guilt against the desire to control unauthorized police con-
duct. Id. at 450-51. See also Comment, Michigan v. Mosley: 4 Further Erosion of Miranda, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861, 865 (1976). The Court did conclude that statements elicited in violation
of Miranda were inadmissible in a subsequent trial, relying on the "fruits of the poisonous tree"
doctrine. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976); Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 584-86 (1892).
51. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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tion of a suspect who had invoked the fifth amendment, but who had
never asked to consult with an attorney.52 Lower courts, nevertheless,
remain divided over whether in-custody suspects' requests for counsel
prohibit the resumption of police questioning until counsel is present.
5 3
The Court in Mosley required only that police officers "fully respect"
54
or "scrupulously honor ' 55 a suspect's rights. 6
Concurrent with the evolution of the fifth amendment right to coun-
sel, the Court grappled with the question of when to apply the sixth
amendment right to counsel.57 In White v. Maryland58 the Court con-
cluded that the right to assistance of counsel attached at "critical
stage[s]I 59 of the judicial process.60 The majority in White deemed the
preliminary hearing one such "critical period."'" One year later, in
Massiah v. United States,62 the Court held that the formal indictment
was a "critical stage" to which the sixth amendment right to counsel
52. Id. at 104-06. Mosley held that interrogation could be resumed if- (1) The original inter-
rogation is promptly terminated; (2) a significant period of time passes between interrogations; (3)
full warnings are repeated at the outset of each interrogation; (4) a different officer conducts the
second interrogation; and (5) the second interrogation covers a different crime. Id.
Some states, notably California, have rejected Mosley as inconsistent with state constitutional
provisions against self-incrimination. People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 246-47, 578 P.2d 108,
117-18, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 870-71 (1978). See also Chase, supra note 3, at 559; Kamisar, supra
note 8, at 71-73.
53. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 371 (1979); People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366,
375, 380 N.E.2d 257, 262, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429, 434 (1978). See generally, White, Rhode Island Y.
Innis:. The Signpicance of a Suspect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CIlM. L. REv. 53
(1979).
54. 423 U.S. at 105.
55. Id. at 103-04. See Kamisar, supra note 8, at 73 n.428.
56. The "scrupulously honor[ed]" standard of police conduct has been widely followed. See,
e.g., United States v. Smith, 608 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hines, 605 F.2d 132
(4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Rodriguez-
Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978); State v. Sauve, 112 Ariz. 576,
544 P.2d 1091 (1976); People v. Traubert, - Colo. _ 608 P.2d 342 (1980); People v. James, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 551, 402 N.E.2d 936 (1980); State v. Greene, 92 N.M. 347, 588 P.2d 548 (1978); People v.
Wander, 47 N.Y.2d 724, 390 N.E.2d 1169, 417 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1979); State v. Roquette, 290
N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1980); Wentela v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 283, 290 N.W.2d 312 (1980).
57. See Note, An HistoricalArgumentfor the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73
YALE L.J. 1000, 1032-33 (1964).
58. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
59. Id. at 60.
60. This approach marked the Court's departure from previously employed due process-
fundamental fairness standards. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
61. 373 U.S. at 60.
62. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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applied.63  The Court expressly reaffirmed the Massiah doctrine64 in
McLeod v. Ohio .65
In Escobedo v. Illinois66 the Court specifically held for the first time
that the sixth amendment applies to custodial interrogation.67 Justice
Goldberg asserted that it would "exalt form over substance" to deny
the right to counsel during interrogation, which could vitiate the value
of a lawyer's assistance at trial.68 In Kirby v. Illinois69 the Court main-
tained, however, that the sixth amendment does not apply before the
"initiation of adversary judicial proceedings"70 and characterized Esco-
bedo as a misplaced effectuation of the fifth amendment privilege.7'
In 1977 the Court decided Brewer v. Williams.72 The Williams ma-
63. Id. at 204-06.
64. In Massiah government officers secured the assistance of one of defendant's confederates
to enable them to hear his damaging statements. The defendant was free on bail after indictment
and had retained counsel when he made compromising admissions in the confederate's automo-
bile which was wired for sound. Id. at 203.
65. 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam). McLeod reversed a state court decision limiting appli-
cation of Massiah to circumstances of surreptitious interrogation or police trickery. 1 Ohio St. 2d
60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964), rey'd, 381 U.S. 356 (1965).
66. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
67. The Escobedo majority constructed the five-part "focus" test to determine whether the
sixth amendment right to counsel applies:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has
been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an
opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of
his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the
Assistance of Counsel". . . and that no statement elicited by the police during the inter-
rogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.
Id. at 490-91.
68. Id. at 486.
69. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
70. Id. at 688. Justice Stewart explained:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the
starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that
the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse posi-
tions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.
Id. at 689. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
71. 406 U.S. at 689. Accord, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976).
72. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Williams was arrested and arraigned for the abduction of a ten-
year-old girl in Davenport, Iowa. At the time the police transported the defendant to Des Moines,
where the abduction took place, the police had not located the child. One of the police officers,
aware that the defendant was a former mental patient and deeply religious, delivered the now
famous "Christian burial speech.' He intimated that the defendant should assist the police in
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jority concluded that police conduct "tantamount to interrogation" 73
rendered inadmissible inculpatory statements elicited from a suspect
after arraignment. The Supreme Court based its decision 74 solely on
sixth amendment grounds.75 As in Massiah, the "deliberate elicitation"
of incriminating statements after Williams' arraignment and in the ab-
sence of counsel violated the petitioner's sixth amendment right to
counsel.76 Significantly, the Court ruled that to show waiver of the
sixth amendment right to counsel the state must bear the heavy burden
of proving "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege."77 The waiver standard under Miranda for the fifth
amendment privilege may no longer be as stringent.78
The Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis79 treated the suspect's
assertion of right to counsel as an invocation of fifth amendment rights,
governed exclusively by Miranda." Recognizing that the police re-
peatedly apprised Innis of his Miranda rights, that Innis invoked his
right to counsel, and that Innis was in custody at the time he made the
damaging admissions, the Court narrowed the issue to whether any
"interrogation" took place at all. If there was no interrogation, the ma-
jority reasoned, then the suspect's right to remain silent and his right to
locating the girl's body because her parents were entitled to a Christian burial for the girl. The
defendant eventually directed the police to the girl's body. Id. at 390-93.
73. Id. at 399-400. The four dissenters insisted the police conduct was not interrogation. Id.
at 435, 440 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, White & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
74. The federal district court granted petitioner habeas corpus relief on three independent
grounds: (1) That Williams' disclosures were involuntary; (2) that they were obtained in violation
of Miranda; and (3) that they were secured in violation ofhis sixth amendment rights. Williams v.
Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 185 (S.D. Iowa 1974), ajt'd, 509 F.2d 227, 233-34 (8th Cir. 1975) (second
and third grounds), aft'd, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See generally Kamisar, Foreword- Brewer v. Wil-
liams-A Hard Look at a Dircomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209 (1977).
75. 430 U.S. at 397-400.
76. Id. at 400; 377 U.S. at 206.
77. 430 U.S. at 404. The source of the constitutional right waiver standard is Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
78. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372 (1979) (North Dakota's refusal to recog-
nize implied waiver of Miranda rights held too inflexible). But see United States v. Satterfield, 417
F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a.§'d 558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1977); Lopez v. Zelker, 344 F. Supp.
1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'dmem. 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972). See
also Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, andthe Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MicH.
L. REv. 1320, 1385-86 (1977); Kamisar, supra note 8, at 28; 56 N.D.L. REv. 259, 267-68 (1980).
79. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
80. Id. at 297, 300 n.4. The Court reviewed the "controlling" principles of Miranda with
regard to the right of presence of counsel. See notes 3, 39-41, 43, 44supra and accompanying text.
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confer with counsel were not impinged."'
The Court noted that Miranda's definition of custodial interroga-
tion 2 could not be limited to direct questioning in order to enforce that
decision's policy of dispelling the inherent compulsion of the "interro-
gation environment."8 3 The Innis majority stressed that custody would
not trigger the fifth amendment protections without the additional
compulsion produced by interrogation. 4 The Court concluded that the
Miranda procedural safeguards operate "whenever a person in custody
is subjected to express questioning or its functional equivalent."8' 5 In-
terrogation under Miranda now includes "any words or actions on the
part of the police. . . that the police should know are reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 6 Courts must
apply the test objectively primarily from the defendant's vantage
81. 446 U.S. at 298. This mode of analysis avoids, or at least delays, the consideration of any
waiver issue. Id. at 298 n.2.
82. 384 U.S. at 444. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
83. 446 U.S. at 298 n.2; 384 U.S. at 457-58. See also Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa.
292, 297, 285 A.2d 172, 175 (1971). It "place[s] a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise
methods of indirect interrogation" to limit Miranda to direct questioning. Id Compare United
States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1978) with United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3013 (1980). In McCain statements by a customs inspector about the
dangers of carrying drugs internally prompted a suspect to relinquish incriminating evidence.
Carpenter sustained the admissibility of a suspect's admission proffered in a police car after he
overheard a conversation between officers about another matter. The court implied that if the
conversation in the vehicle had been related to defendant's case it would have constituted an
interrogation. 611 F.2d at 116. Cf. Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (inno-
cent questions in inherently compelling atmosphere of stationhouse may create in suspect the
impression that he must answer).
Whether provocative declarative statements, actions or artifices constitute interrogation has
been decided on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3013 (1980); Walker v.
Wilmot, 603 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Riddle, 563 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1020 (1978); United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
953 (1976); United States v. Williams, 526 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Menichino,
497 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1974); Combs v.
Wingo, 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Barnes, 432 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1970); Milani v.
Pate, 425 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
84. 446 U.S. at 299-300 (quoting 384 U.S. at 478).
85. Id. at 300-01.
86. Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted). The focus on police intentions is not unprecedented. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Shepherd, - Pa. Super. Ct - 409 A.2d 894 (1979) (if no expectation of
admission and police conduct is not attempt to obtain admission, no interrogation); People v.
Faison, 78 Illi. App. 3d 911, 397 N.E.2d 1233 (1979) (interrogation encompasses any remarks,
psychological tactics or patient maneuvering designed to elicit a response).
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point.8 7 Admissions made by defendants after the police do or say
something that reasonably should not induce incriminating responses
remain unforeseeable and are potentially admissible into evidence.8
Justice Stewart, applying the "new" standard 9 to the Innis facts,
found no interrogation because there was no "express questioning," as
Innis was merely exposed to a dialogue between police officers. Fur-
thermore, the officers did not subject Innis to the "functional
equivalent" of direct questioning because the officers had no reason to
know "that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incrim-
inating response ... .9 The Court conceded that the police sub-
jected Innis to "subtle compulsion," but declined to equate "subtle
compulsion" with "interrogation." '91
Justices Marshall and Brennan, in dissent, agreed with the Court's
"interrogation" formulation. 92 They did not concur, however, in the
majority's application of the interrogation definition to the facts.93 In
the two Justices' view, the Court's attempt to characterize the exchange
87. 446 U.S. at 301-02.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 302. In substance, the "objective" test propounded in Inns is not altogether new.
See United States v. Williams, 526 F.2d 1000, 1003 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Vasquez, 476
F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lewis, 425 F. Supp. 1166, 1176 (D. Conn. 1977);
Santos v. Bayley, 400 F. Supp. 784, 795 (M.D. Pa. 1975); People v. Arguello, 65 Cal. 2d 768, 775,
423 P.2d 202, 206, 56 Cal. Rptr. 274, 278 (1967); Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 226, 252
A.2d 575, 578 (1975).
90. 446 U.S. at 302. Three dissenting justices insisted that Innis was subjected to the func-
tional equivalent of interrogation. Id. at 305 (Marshall & Brennan, J.J., dissenting); id. at 307
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart offered the following factors for judicial consideration when gauging the reason-
ableness of police conduct: (1) Knowledge by the police of a particular suspect's susceptibility to
an appeal to his conscience; (2) a suspect's disorientation at the time of arrest; (3) the use of
intrinsically evocative words; and (4) the span of time in which the police conduct was carried out.
Id. at 302-03.
91. Id. at 303. This conclusion contravened the Supreme Court of Rhode Island's determi-
nation that "subtle compulsion" and "interrogation" are indistinguishable. - R-L at - 391 A.2d
at 1162.
92. 446 U.S. at 305 (Marshall & Brennan, J.J., dissenting). Justice White and Chief Justice
Burger filed separate concurring opinions. Justice White would have reversed the decision of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, employing the reasons he stated in dissent in Brewr . l*7iams.
Justice White would examine the fairness of the police conduct to the defendant and the societal
risk involved in allowing the particular police conduct to continue. Id. at 304 (White, J., concur-
ring).
Chief Justice Burger feared that lnnis would introduce "new elements of uncertainty" to the
application of Ifdliams but concurred because the result was not inconsistent with Mirunda. Id.
at 304-05 (Burger, CJ., concurring). See also note 6 supra and accompanying text.
93. 446 U.S. at 305 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
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between the officers as "a few off-hand remarks" not addressed to the
subject was inapposite.94 The Justices contended that the remarks con-
stituted a patent appeal to the conscience.95 Because the conversation
was not directed to the accused did not reduce the compulsion on the
defendant to speak.96
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion, admonished the
Court's neglect of the "scrupulously honor[ed]" standard.97 Faithful
adherence to that doctrine, he surmised, should require proscription of
deliberate attempts to elicit incriminating responses after suspects re-
quest assistance of counsel.98 He found that the majority rule would
not always adequately protect the accused. 99 Alternatively, Justice Ste-
94. Id. at 306 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Justice Marshall reasoned: "If the
statements had been addressed to petitioner, it would be impossible to draw such a conclusion.
The simple message of the 'talking back and forth' between Gleckman and McKenna was that
they had to find the shotgun to avert a child's death." Id.
95. Id. (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued-
One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a suspect-any sus-
pect-than the assertion that if the weapon is not found an innocent person will be hurt
or killed. And not just any innocent person, but an innocent child-a little girl--a help-
less, handicapped little girl on her way to schooL
Id. Justice Marshall also noted that this sort of ploy is a classic interrogation technique. See note
45 m rm and accompanying text.
96. 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Justice Marshall concludes:
"They knew petitioner would hear and attend to their conversation, and they are chargeable with
knowledge of and responsibility for the pressures to speak which they created." Id. at 306-07.
97. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). See
notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
98. 446 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' approach strongly resembles the
Marsiah-Brewer "deliberate elicitation" test. Id. at 310 n.7. The majority believed that the in-
terrogation standard they promulgated would proscribe deliberate attempts to elicit incriminating
responses by the police. Id. at 301-02 n.7. Justices Marshall and Brennan agreed with the major-
ity in the formulation of the standard but dissented in its application to the particular facts. Id. at
305.
99. Id. at 312 (Stevens, J., dissenting). By way of example, Justice Stevens poses three hy-
potheticals illustrating distinct ways the police officer could have conveyed his concern about the
threat to the children's safety posed by the shotgun:
He could have:
(1) directly asked Innis:
Will you please tell me where the shotgun is so we can protect handicapped school
children from danger?
(2) announced to other officers in the wagon:
If the man sitting in the back seat with me should decide to tell us where the gun is,
we can protect handicapped children from danger.
(3) or stated to the officers:
It would be too bad if a little handicapped girl would pick up the gun that this man
left in the area and maybe kill herself.
Id. Reasoning that all three appear bent on eliciting a response; Justice Stevens noted that the
majority's test would only prohibit the first; the second not being likely to elicit an incriminating
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vens recommended modification of the definition of "interrogation" to
include any statement or conduct by the police "that [objectively] has
the same purpose or effect as a direct question.""''
The Court's narrow fifth amendment analysis presents two related
difficulties. First, the new interrogation definition represents a diminu-
tion of Miranda's procedural safeguards. Second, the strict reliance on
the fifth amendment perpetuates artificial divisions between the appli-
cability of the fifth and sixth amendments. The degree of protection
that an assertion of right to counsel affords a suspect now may depend
exclusively on a judicially contrived point in time entirely within the
control of the police."'
Justice Stevens' dissent amply demonstrates that courts will not pro-
hibit all deliberate attempts to elicit information. 2 The majority rec-
ognized that their test allows police to extract statements subtly.'0 3
This simply ignores the thrust of the Miranda opinion' °4 and casts
doubt on the efficacy of the "scrupulously honor[ed]" standard of
response; and the third not excludable from evidence because the officers had no knowledge of
Innis' particular susceptibility to this type of appeal. Id. at 312-13. See White, supra note 53, at
68 (viewed objectively the remarks were designed to elicit a response).
100. 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. See People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 160, 367 P.2d 680, 695, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 55 (1961)
(Traynor, J., concurring), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 929 (1962); Kamisar, supra note 8, at 81-82. Of
course, prompt arraignment statutes may provide an outside limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 5(a) (1976).
102. See note 99 supra and accompanying text. The analysis contemplates a new threshold
question-whether there was or was not an interrogation-that is answerable by a multifactor test.
This approach is reminiscent of the voluntariness-totality of circumstances formula that previ-
ously was considered inadequate to protect suspects' rights. See Amsterdam, supra note 34, at
786-88, 809; Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 42, at 72-73; Kamisar, supra note 19, at 102-03; Stone,
supra note 47, at 124; White, supra note 34, at 586. See also A. BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 70-107 (1955).
One might profitably reflect on what effect this test will have on the exclusionary rule or other
devices employed to deter police misconduct. Presumably, if the police attempt to interrogate a
suspect after an assertion of his rights either the information elicited will be excluded because the
police should have known their conduct was likely to induce the incriminating response or it will
be admissible. If the police, however, make no such attempt they may never get the information
into evidence. Thus, there may no longer be a reason for the police to refrain. See generally
Smith, The Threshold Question Appling Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25
S.C. L. REv. 699 (1974); Yarbrough, The Flexible Exclusionary Rule and the Crime Rate, 6 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 1 (1978); Note, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Independent Source Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 137 (1976).
103. 446 U.S. at 303.
104. 384 U.S. at 467. "In order to combat [the inherently compelling pressures of in-custody
interrogation] and to permit full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination,
the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those
rights must be fully honored." Id.
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police conduct. 10 5
If the police formally indicted or arraigned Innis, his fate would be
markedly different." The Court explained in a footnote that the new
meaning of interrogation probably would not apply to a person after
the institution of formal judicial proceedings. 07 Massiah holds that
the police may not "deliberately elicit" statements from an indicted
suspect in the absence of counsel without violating the sixth amend-
ment.'1 8 As Justice Stevens perceptively recognized in Innis, the police
may deliberately elicit responses without interrogating, thereby avoid-
ing contravention of fifth amendment privileges. 0 9 The majority justi-
fies the different treatment in terms of the disparate policies behind the
fifth and sixth amendments." 0 The operational effect of the amend-
ments, however, is the exclusion from evidence of statements extracted
from an arrestee or charged defendant in custody in the absence of
counsel. An indicted suspect may have a heightened awareness of the
seriousness of his predicament and the need to guard his words. Nev-
ertheless, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that a person's re-
marks somehow will be less damaging at trial because the police did
not formally indict the individual."' Furthermore, waiver of essen-
tially the same constitutional right now may be easier in the fifth
105. 423 U.S. at 103-04. "A reasonable and faithful interpretation of the Miranda opinion
must rest on the [Miranda Court's intention] to adopt 'fully effective means . . . to notify the
person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously
honored .... .' Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479).
106. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (defendant arraigned-sixth amendment
right to counsel attached).
107. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
108. 377 U.S. at 204.
109. 446 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. The basic policy underlying the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel is, simply
stated: The framers intended to offset the grave disadvantage faced by defendants who were
forced to stand alone at trial against the state. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961);
note 70 supra and accompanying text. See generally W. BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERI-
CAN COURTS 24 (1955); P. LEWIS & K. PEOPLES, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSEO 549-
51 (1979); Note, supra note 57, at 1033.
The policy underlying the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the desire to
proscribe compulsory self-incrimination. But see Comment, The Right to Counsel in Police Inter-
rogation Cases: Miranda and Williams, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 112, 114 (1977) (criticizing separa-
tion of policies underlying fifth and sixth amendments). See generally notes 19-21 supra and
accompanying text.
11. See Kamisar, supra note 8, at 78 n.461, 80-81. See also Traynor, The Devils of Due Proc-
ess in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657, 673 (1966).
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amendment context." 2
Innis should be constitutionally indistinguishable from Brewer v.
Williams.! 3 In Williams, as in Innis, members of the Court sharply
disagreed whether the police conduct constituted interrogation! 14 The
majority in Williams, however, found that the police violated the sus-
pect's sixth amendment rights. In Innis the Court based its decision
solely on the fifth amendment, and dismissed potential sixth amend-
ment considerations. The only meaningful distinction was the defend-
ant's arraignment in Williams." 5 The petitioner's saving grace in
Williams, therefore, was the mere fortuitous circumstance that he had
been arraigned before the "interrogation" took place.
The police now may shape the applicability of constitutional safe-
guards by regulating the hour of indictment. The Court should have
employed Innis to develop a unitary theory of application of the fifth
and sixth amendments. Regardless of the subject's status the theory
should prevent "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating responses and
should "scrupulously honor" an accused's right to counsel. Subtle
compulsion, whether intended or not, should be impermissible under
this objective standard. Any definition of interrogation should apply
coextensively to both amendments.
So long as the Court continues to retrench on Miranda's protection
of fifth amendment principles and to perpetuate the unsupported disas-
sociation of fifth and sixth amendment safeguards, Rhode Island v. In-
nis will remain significant. Unless persons in the equally
compromising positions of arrest and formal charge are allowed equal
protection from potentially abusive police practices, glaring injustices
will surely result from the furtherance in Innis of technical, arbitrary,
112. See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
113. 446 U.S. at 310 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Subtle fact finding problems do not disappear. The inflection of a voice and the individ-
ual's degree of sensitivity to particular practices are but two of the variables that courts have
difficulty measuring. This consideration points to the need for general, simple guidelines for the
police and courts to follow. See White, supra note 34, at 586 (proposing formulation of per se
rules proscribing unacceptable police conduct).
115. Other ostensible distinctions could be that Williams' retained counsel, that the police
entered a pre-transportation agreement with Williams not to interrogate during the 160 mile jour-
ney from Davenport to Des Moines, that the police had prior knowledge of Williams' susceptibil-
ity to an emotional religious appeal and that the conversation was directed at Williams. The case,
however, did not turn on these considerations. The Court found the circumstances in Williams
indistinguishable from Maslah, and focused on the deliberate elicitation of information from the
defendant without the constitutionally mandated assistance of counsel 430 U.S. at 397-401.
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and formalistic distinctions governing the time at which each amend-
ment attaches.
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